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1 Introduction
It is a fact that women in most OECD countries work less hours in the market than men, specially married
women. Theoretical models that try to explain this feature are based on the comparative advantage of women
in home production, the bargaining decision making within the family or the role of identity in economic
decisions. Despite the strong increase in female participation in most OECD countries, large cross-country
discrepancies in the participation rates persist that can be explained to a large extent by di¤erences in
education, the functioning of labor markets, the existence of public policies to reconcile work and family
and cultural attitudes. A related issue is the preference for part-time work since it allows not only a more
e¢ cient allocation of time between market work and family responsibilities but also a greater exibility to
gradually enter or exit the labor market. Nonetheless a workers supply of part-time employment depends
not only on their personal or family needs, it is often limited by disadvantageous labor contract conditions.
The aim of the paper is the gender analysis of the extent to which part-time work represents an individuals
preferred labor market situation. It includes a theoretical model that delivers some predictions about the
households preferences over non-chosen employment states and an empirical analysis of the employment
status determinants of individuals that live with a partner (married or living as married) for the case of
Spain.
Recent studies point out that men and women not only allocate their time between market and home
duties in very di¤erent ways but also that there exist important di¤erences across countries in time use and
values that can be related to the existence of social norms or gender role attitudes (Burda, Hammermesh
and Weil, 2008, and Fortin 2005). For example, in a sample of 14 EU countries Jaumotte (2004) documents
the preferences of couples with small children over three working options, non-work, part-time and full-time,
and compares these preferences with their actual patterns of employment. The traditional male breadwinner
model (the man works full-time and the woman does not work) is, on average, preferred only by ten percent
of the couples, although about 38 percent of them have it actually.1 By countries, Spain has the largest
preference for this kind of employment arrangement (19.7 percent, followed by France with 14 percent) and
the United Kingdom is the only country in the sample where the actual rate of couples with both partners
working full-time is larger than the the rate of couples prefering this pattern of employment. It is also
remarkable that in all countries the rate of couples prefering the man working full-time and the woman
working part-time is higher than the rate of couples with this employment arragement, which is indicative
of the potential rise in participation that can arise from more and better jobs on a part-time basis.
The World Values Survey publishes, for example, the rate of agreement of some countriespopulation
1The study does not distinguish between inactive and unemployed women, so the actual non-participation option share
should be lower, specially in high unemployment countries like Spain.
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with statements like When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. Thus, the
individualspreference for a given family pattern of employment can be inuenced by their concerns about
traditonal gender roles attitudes towards family life and work. In this survey Spain has one of the largest
rate of married (or living as married) male agreement with this statement, whereas this rate among married
(or living as married) female is below the European average2 . In this study, rst we develop a model of the
household where individuals have preferences about the familys division of labor between market and home
activities and provide su¢ cient conditions for a welfare ranking over the households possible employment
patterns that is consistent with some features of the Spanish data. Moreover, we show that the individuals
concerns about the traditional division of labor are crucial for the stability properties of the households
employment pattern; in particular, under relative general conditions on the parameter space, we nd that
the man working full-time and the woman working part-time pattern can be stable only if the woman is
more traditional than the man. The basic idea dening the household preferences is taken from Akerlof and
Kranton (2000) and the endogenous determination of the mans weight in the collective decision unit from
Basu (2004).
In the empirical analysis we use the micro data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA) for the
years 2000 and 2008 (although EPA is a rotating panel we focus on the comparative statics of involuntary
employment). In the EPA data, as in the EUROSTAT data, involuntary part-time workers are those having a
part-time job because they have not found a full-time one. First, we explore the implications of this and other
extended denitions of involuntary employment and show that a denition based on the desire of working
more hours combined with the reasons of having a part-time job improves the t of the model by more
than 50 percent, regardless of the gender, suggesting the importance of accounting properly for involuntary
employment. Second, we analyze the relative importance of individual, family and job related variables on
the probabilities of involuntary and voluntary part-time employment. We nd that being married decreases
(increases) the part-time and full-time employment probabilities of women (men) living with a partner, but
that the presence of small children has a negative inuence on the employment probability of women and
non signicant e¤ect on the labor status of men.3 Furthermore, we nd that education attainment seems
more relevant for the employment probability of a woman than for a man. Finally, we show that having
grown-up children and a xed term contract increases the probability of involuntary part-time relative to
voluntary part-time employment by 22 and 60 percent, respectively.
2For instance, the percentage of married men that agree with this statment is 29 in Italy, 23.9 in Spain, 22.1 in Geramny,
20 in The United Kingdom, 17.1 in The Netherlands, 17 in France and 9 in Norway. In the case of married women these rates
are 26 for Italy, 19.7 for France, 18.8 for Germany, 18 for The United Kingdom, 16.3 for The Netherlands, 16.1 for Spain and
6.1 for Norway.
3These results contrast with those of Blázquez-Cuesta and Ramos-Martín (2009) where having children aged under 12 and
living with a partner do not increase the probability of working part-time.
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The fact that part-time employment in developed countries is mainly concentrated on low educated
women and low skilled occupations in the service sector is well documented, for example, by Manning and
Petrongolo (2004). They also nd that there exists an important wage penalty associated to part-time
employment which can be explained to a large extent by the high degree of occupational segregation, being
Spain one of the countries with the largest occupational segregation in female employment. Fernandez-Kranz
and Rodriguez-Planas (2009) show that the part-time pay penalty in Spain is larger and more persistent
in the case of women with xed-term contracts, whereas ODorchai, Plasman and Rycx (2007) show that
the part-time wage penalty of men in Spain is negligible. This and the positive association we nd between
involuntary part-time employment and xed term contracts in Spain suggest that the part-time wage penalty
can be responsible of a large fraction of Spanish involuntary employment.
Another important issue when considering part-time work as a preferred employment option is the pos-
sibility of switching from full-time to part-time employment during some periods of the life cycle without
losing the skill level attachment of the previous full-time job. Moreover, the relation between part-time work
opportunities and the presence of small children is crucial for the labor force attachment of many women and
their job and life satisfaction of their families. These issues are analyzed for the case of Britain in Connolly
and Gregory (2008), Paull (2008) and Booth and van Ours (2008), the case of Australia is analyzed in Booth
and van Ours (2005), the case of Spain by Fernandez-Kranz and Rodriguez-Planas (2009) and the case of a
developing country (Honduras) in López-Bóo, Madrigal and Pagés (2009). To our knowledge there is not an
empirical study analysing the e¤ect of the age of children on the probability of involuntary part-time relative
to voluntary part-time employment. We nd that in Spain having small children decreases by 50 percent the
probability of involuntary part-time relative to voluntary part-time employment but, as already mentioned,
the presence of children aged between 12 and 15 incecreases the relative probability of involuntary part-time
by 22 percent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some data about Spanish part-time
employment trying to identify the main (individual and family) factors that shape the labor supply with a
focus on individuals that live with a partner. In Section 3 we develop a model of the household. In Section
4 we conduct the empirical investigation and in Section 5 we conclude.
2 Some features of part-time employment in Spain
As in most OECD countries, part-time (PT) employment in Spain is concentrated on the female population.
Figure 1 illustrates the marginal distribution of market hours per week during the rst quarter of 2008. We
can observe clearly that workweeks are concentrated around 40 hours, that there are practically no men
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Figure 1: Distribution of worked hours per week
working less than 40 hours and that PT employment is much more frequent among women.
There are mainly two types of denitions for PT employment, objective  a PT worker usually works
less hours than those of a comparable full-time (FT) worker and subjective  the employees spontaneous
answer to what type of employment do you have, FT or PT? . In general it is not possible to establish a
precise distinction between PT and FT since the standard workweek can vary from one country to another
or from one activity to another. In this Section we follow the subjective denition used in the Spanish labor
force survey, but in the empirical analysis of Section 4 we will extend this denition in several directions,
including some working hours criterium. These extensions will try to capture, on the one side, the large
heterogeneity and dispersion of PT employment relative to FT employment and, on the other, the voluntary
or involuntary character of the labor situation.
To account for the heterogeneity of PT employment some authors distinguish between substantialPT
and marginalPT, depending on the number of working hours per week (e.g. it can be considered marginal
up to 19 hours and substantial from 20 up to 34 hours).
A feature in Table 1 is that men work more hours than women in all types of employment. One possible
explanation to this fact is that women hold PT jobs for very di¤erent reasons than men do and this somehow
conditions the type of labor contract they have. These reasons are reported in Table 2 and correspond to all
possible answers to why do you have a part-time employment?. In each year box, the second and fourth
columns report the gender distribution of a given answer (row) and the third and fth show how often each
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Table 1: Total worked hours per week, households reference person or spouse
Men Women
2000 2008 2000 2008
FT
mean
sd
43:14 43:9
7:92 8:09
40:47 38:89
6:73 6:77
PT
mean
sd
19:96 19:27
6:06 7:07
17:87 19:14
6:72 7:10
Substantial PT
mean
sd
22:73 23:24
3:20 3:55
22:33 23:22
3:07 3:66
Marginal PT
mean
sd
11:88 11:14
4:05 4:74
11:01 11:26
4:33 4:70
Souce: EPA and own calculation.
Table 2: Reasons of having PT employment, gender distribution of a given reason (row), reasons distribution
in each gender (column)
2000
Men
Row Col.
Women
Row Col.
Education, training 47:4 13:7 52:6 4:2
Illness 60:0 3:0 40:0 0:6
Family obligations 1:2 0:6 98:8 13:7
FT not found 22:0 22:5 78:0 21:9
FT not wanted 16:1 4:1 83:9 5:9
Type of activity 20:9 37:0 79:1 38:2
Other reasons 26:3 18:1 73:7 13:9
Unknown reason 13:1 0:6 86:9 1:7
2008
Men
Row Col.
Women
Row Col.
Education, training 42:8 26:2 57:2 8:5
Illness 43:8 4:5 56:2 1:4
Family obligations 5:4 3:4 94:6 14:3
Children care 1:4 1:2 98:3 17:5
FT not found 17:7 27:6 82:3 31:2
FT not wanted 14:7 10:0 85:3 14:2
Other reasons 34:0 26:3 66:0 12:4
Unknown reason 26:9 0:9 73:1 0:6
Souce: EPA and own calculation
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Table 3: Searching options of the unemployed (workweek supplies) for a given gender (column), distribution
of a given option by gender (row), percentage
2000
5,018 Men
Row Col.
7,090 Women
Row Col.
FT only 53:9 20:8 46:1 12:6
FT, PT 38:5 27:6 61:5 31:2
PT, FT 15:7 0:9 84:3 3:4
PT only 17:6 1:5 82:4 5:1
Any type 42:2 49:2 57:8 47:7
2008
5,018 Men
Row Col.
7,090 Women
Row Col.
FT only 52:2 57:0 47:8 47:0
FT, PT 38:5 6:9 61:5 7:7
PT, FT 15:6 0:6 84:4 1:7
PT only 19:9 6:1 80:1 13:3
Any type 41:4 29:3 58:6 30:4
Souce: EPA and own calculation
Table 4: Individuals living with a partner who want to work more hours, percentage
2000 2008
Hours +34 20-34 1-19 +34 20-34 1-19
Men 0.9 14.8 43.1 6.8 17.5 44.6
Women 0.5 13.5 34.7 3.8 22.4 45.8
Womens share 18.5 73.6 86.8 26.4 87.8 91.9
Souce: EPA and own calculation
answer is given by men and women (col), respectively. For example, 47.4 percent of workers who have a
PT job because they are undertaking some education or training program are men in 2000 and this share
has fallen to 42.8 in 2008; whereas 13.7 percent of men and only 4.2 percent of women in 2000 have it for
that reason. This table also reveals that having a PT job due to family obligations is mainly a womens
motive, although in the last years more men have PT employment for this reason. The fact that most of
PT workers that do not want a FT job are also women (around 83 percent in both years) goes probably in
the same direction, since these data usually correspond to women being in households where men hold FT
jobs. Moreover, the majority of workers that have a PT job because they have not found a FT one are also
women.
Finally, unemployed workers have preferences about the type of workweek they want. Table 3 reports that
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the distribution of each searching option across genders has remained practically the same but the distribution
of workweek supplies has experienced important changes for each gender. The categories FT only and FT,
PT (i.e. FT as the rst option) have become more and less important over the years, respectively. The
same thing happens for the categories PT only and PT, FT (i.e. PT as the rst option). In other words,
preferences about workweek types have become more polarized. Thus, if we want to properly account for the
determinants of the (voluntary) PT labor supply we have to start by specifying what do we understand by a
(voluntary) PT worker (unemployed or employed). With respect to the unemployed we can say that she is a
PT seeker (i.e., she is searching for PT only or for PT as the rst option), but with respect to the employed
there is not a clear cut between voluntary and involuntary. We can say that an involuntary PT employed
worker is a worker with a PT job who wants to work FT or more hours, whereas a voluntary PT worker
does not want a FT job. But then there can be a large number of PT workers who are neither voluntary nor
involuntary. Table 4 illustrates the importance of the distinction between a free choice (voluntary) and a
constrained (involuntary) employment situation. It shows that the percentage of workers who prefer to work
more hours is quite high for people with marginalPT and that the majority of workers who want to work
more hours, both substantial and marginal PT, are women. In the empirical anlysis of Section 4 we try to
solve this ambiguity combining the reasons of having a PT employment with a control variable for hours.
Next we present a model of the household where agents have some preferences about the traditional
division of labor between market and home production trying to reproduce some of the facts reported in this
section. The importance of traditional gender role attitudes in Spain is analyzed, for example, by Alvarez
and Miles (2003) in the context of two-earner couples; they nd that the unequal division of domestic work
between wifes and husbands is mainly explained by gender-specic e¤ects rather than by di¤erences in their
observable characteristics.
3 A model of the household
The models of the household that try to explain why men spend more time in market work than in house work
relative to women are based on the comparative advantage of women in home production, the bargaining
decision making within the family or the role of identity in economic decisions. Here we adopt one of the
simplest possible environments and assume that men and women have the same productivity at home but
they can have di¤erent (exogenous) productivities in the market and di¤erent tastes about the households
traditional pattern of employment. The basic idea is taken from Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we suppose
that there is some social attachment to the man breadwinner model and that actions against this pattern can
have a utility cost. Moreover, we assume that agents relative weight in the household decision unit depends
7
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Figure 2: The womans labour supply, three possible outcomes depending on the type of household and the
level of the weighting factor.
on market income as in Basu (2004).
Consider a household composed by two productive adults, a woman and a man, each having a unit of
productive time that can be allocated between house work and market work. They do not value leisure, but
they are concerned about the traditional gender roles in the division of total family work. Agents obtain
utility from the consumption of two goods, a market good and a home good. The former can also be used
as an input in home production at zero cost. The latter is a public good inside the household, which cannot
be traded in the market.
The home good, z, is produced according to the following technology:
z = A [k + b (2  lf   lm)] ; A; b > 0 (1)
A is a measure of total factor productivity at home that can depend on a variety of factors like the number
of dependent family members or anything inuencing the social infrastructure of the family, like acces to
child-care public services. The parameter b is the relative productivity of time in home production, which
is assumed to be the same for the woman and the man. The variable k represents the amount of the
market good used as an input in home production and the term (2  lf   lm) is total time employed in home
production, where lf and lm represent the womans and the mans labor market supplies, respectively.
The time and budget constraints faced by the household are, respectively:
0  li  1; i = f;m; (2)
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c+ k = a+ wf lf + wmlm: (3)
Where c represents total households consumption of the market good, a and wi are the exogenous
non-labor income and real wage of adult i, i = f , m; respectively.
A household or a family is a decision unit whose objetive is to maximize a weighted sum of the individual
utilities,
Um + (1  )Uf ; (4)
subject to (1), (2) and (3). The weighting factor  2 [0; 1] represents the mans relative weight in the decision
unit, to be explained below. The individualsutility functions are identical except for a term that captures
the personal concern about the traditional family:
Ui =
c

+ 
z

+ si  (lm   lf ) ;  > 0; 0 <  < 1; (5)
0  si  1; i = f;m:
That is, each individual cares about total household consumption of both goods in the same way, the
term si represents the personal concern of individual i about the traditional family, which is captured by the
term in brackets.4 For simplicity we have also assumed that agents care about the family consumption of
the market good instead of the private consumption of that good. Finally,  and  are positive parameters
directly related, respectively, to the importance of the home good in an agents utility and to the elasticity
of substitution between c and z.
3.1 The households labor supply
In this section we solve the problem of the household assuming that the weighting factor  is given. Substi-
tuting (1) and (5) into (4), the problem of the household amounts to maximize
c

+ 
[A (k + b (2  lf   lm))]

+ (lm   lf )S; (6)
subject to (2), (3) and the non-negative constrains for c and k, where the term S = sm + (1  ) sf
represents the households concern about the traditional family. Note that S depends on  only if sm 6= sf ;
and increases with  if and only if the man is more traditional than the woman sm > sf : Depending on the
4This term tries to capture the agreement with staments like Being a housewife is just as fullling as working for payfound
in Spain and other countries. See for example Fortin (2005).
9
value of wages, preferences and production parameters, there can be two kinds of scenarios: one in which
the only input in home production is time and another one in which positive amounts of the market good
are used as a home input. For concreteness, let us assume that the space of parameters implies the latter
scenario.5
If individuals do not care about the traditional division of labor, S = 0; the solution to this problem
implies that lj = 1 whenever wj > b; l

j = 0 whenever wj < b; and l

j 2 (0; 1) if wj = b: Let us focus on the
case S > 0 and wj  b for all j: The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions of this problem imply that it is
always optimal that the man works full time in the market, lm = 1; whereas the labor supply of the woman
will be positive only if the marginal consumption utility gain implied by working an additional hour in the
market is no less than S: Formally, the womans labor supply is given by
lsf =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if S  Y0
l 2 (0; 1) if Y1 < S < Y0
1 if S  Y1
(7)
Where Y0 and Y1; given lm; represent the marginal consumption utility gain of working in the market when
lf = 0 and lf = 1; respectively, and l is the womans PT labor supply:
Y0 = (wf   b)
 
1 +  (A)
=(1 )
lm (wm   b) + 2b
!1 
; (8)
Y1 = (wf   b)
 
1 +  (A)
=(1 )
lm (wm   b) + wf + b
!1 
; (9)
l =
1 +  (A)
=(1 )
S
1=(1 )

(wf   b)

1    (l

m (wm   b) + 2b)
wf   b : (10)
The three options described in (7), non-work (NW), part-time (PT), full-time (FT) are illustarted in
Figure 2. The decreasing curve represents the marginal consumption utility gain of working in the market.
An increase in the total factor productivity parameter A will shift this curve upwards and tend to increase
market time, whereas a rise in the individuals home productivity b will work in the opposite direction. The
three horizontal lines represent three arbitrary levels of the households concern about the traditional family
that imply, respectively, three labor outcomes, NW , PT and FT . That is, everything else the same, less
traditional families, low levels of S; tend to assign larger values of lsf . Moreover, given the individuals
preferences about the tradition, the level of S will rise (fall) with  if the man (woman) is more traditional
5A su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that (A)1=(1 ) a  2Ab > 0:
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than the woman (man). Notice also that the optimal amount of the womans market time is inversely related
to the mans labor income and the level of non-labor income. A rise in wmlm + a decreases the marginal
utility of consumption and shifts downwards the downsloping curve in Figure 2, having a negative e¤ect on
the womans labor supply.
Given ; our rst exercise is to analyze the households welfare ranking over all possible employment
options, since the market outcome does not always coincide with the optimal allocation. Given (7), it is
not di¢ cult to show that when FT is optimal, PT employment is preferred to NW , and it is not possible
that NW can be better than PT . But when working PT is optimal, NW can be better than FT or not.
Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 Suppose that S > 0; wi > b; i = m; f . Then, the households preferences over the womans
employment options satisfy the following ranking:
(i) If working FT is optimal, then PT  NW:
(ii) If working PT is optimal, then FT  NW or NW  FT:
Comparing these implications of the model with the employment preferences reported in Table 3, we note
that the model cannot explain why some individuals prefer working FT and at the same time they prefer
NW over working PT (FT only), or why some individuals can be indi¤erent between working FT and
working PT (any-type). The reason is that we are assuming that the FT and PT hourly wages are the
same, but relaxing this assumption and assuming that there exists a PT pay penalty the model can generate
these alternative rankings over all the employment options.6
3.2 The determination of the weighting factor
So far we have assumed that the mans weight in the collective decision unit, ; was exogenous. In this
section we suppose that at the beginning of the period the man o¤ers an arbitrary level of  (it can be
equal to one, which gives him the maximum decision power, or it can be less than one, reecting some
initial conditions in the marriage contract), which is revised once agents face wages and decide the optimal
allocation of time. In particular, focusing on the case S > 0; wi > b and given wages, we shall assume that
 is a decreasing and concave function of the womans labor supply,  (lf ), that takes values on the interval
; 

; 0   <   1:
Given wages and an initial level of , (7) determines the womans labor supply, this optimal allocation of
time can cause a change in the factor  and the household will adjust lsf further if sm 6= sf . We follow Basu
6This implication does not depend on the specic functional form of our utility function, it only requires the households
value function being concave in lf :
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Figure 3: The determination of the weighting factor and the households equilibrium
(2004) and dene the equilibrium of the household as a stationary solution to this iterative process. That is,
the process will continue until a pair

lf ; 


is attained where lf satises (7) for given 
, and  = 

lf

.
In other words, we can interpret the equilibrium of the household as the outcome of an iterative process in
which current labor income determines tomorrows distribution of power within the household (see Figure
3).
As we mentioned above, a fall in  will shift a given line S in Figure 2 downwards or upwards, respectively,
depending on whether the mans concern about the tradition is stronger or weaker than the womans. If the
man is more concerned than the woman, sm > sf , the womans labor supply will be non-increasing in .
But if the woman is more concerned about the tradition than the man, a rise in  will tend to increase her
labor supply. For illustration purposes, consider two households with identical individual wages where the
men work full time (wj > b; j = m; f) and technologies except for the individualsconcern about the social
tradition; in one household the man is more traditional than the woman and in the other the woman is more
traditional than the man. In particular suppose that in each household the womans labor supply is positive
when the weighting factor is : Each panel in Figure 3 illustrates one possible dynamics of the weighting
factor for a given initial value 0 in each type of household. The bold curves represent the relationship
between lsf and  obtained from (7), which is called the earnings-curve; and the thin decreasing curve
represents the weighting function  (lf ). So the intersection of both curves will determine the equilibrium
of the household. The case illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3, sm > sf ; shows three possible outcomes
(0; ) =NW , (l; ) =PT and
 
1; 

=FT , where the two corner solutions are (locally) stable and the interior
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solution is unstable. In contrast, the case illustrated in the right panel of Figure 3, sf > sm; where the
labor supply is increasing in , shows that the PT equilibrium is unique and stable. The conditions for the
uniqueness and stability of the household equilibrium are analyzed in the mathematical appendix. Here let
us concentrate on the cases illustrated in Figure 3.
The arrows in Figure 3 show the direction of the iterative process starting at any arbitrary value of 0
in the interval

; 

: When the equilibrium of the household is unique and stable (right panel), the initial
condition does not matter, the man can initially o¤er the highest factor  or any other, this will determine
an initial level of lsf through the earnings-curve, which in turn will point to a value of 1 on the weighting
function, and so forth; this process gives values of  and lsf that approach the PT stationary equilibrium
(l; ). Things are very di¤erent on the left panel of Figure 3. Here the equilibrium of the household
depends on initial conditions. The PT stationary equilibrium (l; ) can be attained only if the initial
condition is ; otherwise, the household converges to the NW equilibrium, (0; ) ; if 0 > 
, or to the FT
equilibrium,
 
1; 

; if 0 < 
:
In summary, for any given 0, we can have two households with the same level of S and so with
the same labor supply initially, but with very di¤erent employment patterns eventually, depending on the
individualsconcern about tradition. For instance, given that family obligationsis mainly a womens reason
of having PT employment, that the majority of PT workers that do not want a full-time job are women
and that the majority of workers searching for a PT job are also women, we could conjecture that a large
fraction of Spanish households with a FT=PT employment pattern is characterized by the woman being more
traditionalthan the man. We leave the empirical test of this interesting conjecture for future research. At
the moment, we explore further the EPA data and analyze the importance of other observable characteristics
in shaping the womans labor supply.
4 The statistical framework
In this section we investigate the main determinants of the employment status of workers living with a
partner, that are either household-heads or household-heads partners. We start with the estimation of an
ordered model and discuss the implications of di¤erent specications in the ordering of alternatives, and
then proceed with a multinomial estimation. In this rst stage we only consider individual and family
characteristics as explanatory variables. In a second stage, we restrict the study to employed individuals
and incorporate a set of market related variables as controls. In both cases we show the importance of
accounting for involuntary PT employment in the classication of categories and the presence of important
gender asymmetries in the determination of the employment situation.
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4.1 Individual and family characteristics
The ordered model applies when there is a natural ordering of alternatives like the non-work, part-time work
and full-time work analyzed above. In our theoretical framework individuals take wages and technologies
as given and choose the employment supply option that maximizes their utility subject to their budget
constraint. In the data, however, individuals have market employment status that can be di¤erent from
their rst-best option. So when using householdsdata we have to dene the employment categories as close
as possible to the natural (supply side) ordering given by (7). In the data we classify individuals according
to the three employment alternatives following di¤erent model specications. First, we follow a common
practice strategy (see, for example, Bardasi and Gornick, 2002) and estimate a model where the category
non-work includes the inactive individuals plus those that are unemployed (Model 1A). Then we drop from
the sample those individuals that are unemployed and estimate a model where the non-work category only
includes the inactive individuals (Model 1B). Finally, we also include the estimation results when we drop
from the non-work category the inactive population and keep only the unemployed workers (Model 1C).
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimation results for women and men, respectively. In both cases the PT and FT
employment categories correspond to the EPA classication: employed individuals that declare themselves
having a PT or a FT job, respectively.
The sample consists of individuals aged between 16 and 64 that live with a partner and are either the
households head or the partner of the households head. The individual characteristics are age (and square
age, as a control variable) and education (four di¤erent levels, primary, secondary rst level, secondary
second level and university), which are not only proxies for experience and productivity, they also can
inuence the age and number of children. The family variables are marital status (non-married includes
single, divorced and widowed), the partners employment, the partners unemployment, age of children (six
school-age intervals), the presence of other employed adults living in the household, and the presence of other
adults older than 64. All the model specications also include dummy variables for the Spanish regions which
are not reported.7
The sign of each estimated coe¢ cient in Tables 5 and 6 shows the direction of the change in the probability
of falling in the end point rankings, non-work, part-time work or full-time work, when the explanatory
variable changes. The probability of non-work changes in the opposite direction from the sign of the estimated
coe¢ cient. So all explanatory variables with a negative sign increase the probability of non-work and decrease
the probability of full-time work. Models 1A, 1B, 1C have di¤erent sample sizes and dependent variables,
so we cannot make comparisons, but Model 1C seems to perform worse than the other two. The reason is
7We have estimated all the models including instead the regional unemployment rates and found very similar results.
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Table 5: Women Ordered Logit, alternative specications for the non-work status, EPA denitions for PT
and FT situations.
2000 2008
1A 1B 1C 1A 1B 1C
Age 0:186
(0:0126)
0:169
(0:0132)
0:071
(0:018)
0:139
(0:010)
0:136
(0:010)
0:012
(0:013)
Age2  0:0026
(0:0001)
 0:0025
(0:0002)
 :0006
(0:0002)
 0:002
(0:0001)
 0:002
(0:0001)
 :00005
(0:0002)
Edu2 0:235
(0:033)
0:258
(0:034)
0:135
(0:048)
0:413
(0:033)
0:424
(0:034)
0:339
(0:047)
Edu3 0:912
(0:036)
1:029
(0:038)
0:641
(0:053)
1:036
(0:034)
1:072
(0:035)
0:820
(0:048)
Edu4 2:00
(0:042)
2:162
(0:045)
1:358
(0:060)
2:033
(0:040)
2:097
(0:041)
1:544
(0:055)
Married  0:336
(0:091)
 0:397
(0:097)
 0:050
(0:114)
 0:3201
(0:043)
 0:423
(0:046)
 0:031
(0:051)
Em.par. 0:211
(0:049)
0:195
(0:050)
0:065
(0:073)
0:468
(0:037)
0:472
(0:037)
0:135
(0:056)
Un.par. 0:069
(0:079)
0:182
(0:082)
 0:574
(0:106)
0:350
(0:068)
0:638
(0:074)
 0:517
(0:082)

Child1  0:535
(0:042)
 0:709
(0:045)
 0:114
(0:057)
 0:697
(0:035)
 0:819
(0:037)
 0:492
(0:043)
Child2  0:417
(0:039)
 0:473
(0:041)
 0:254
(0:053)
 0:362
(0:032)
 0:399
(0:033)
 0:319
(0:040)
Child3  0:332
(0:031)
 0:353
(0:032)
 0:298
(0:042)
 0:139
(0:030)
 0:145
(0:031)
 0:144
(0:039)
Child4  0:144
(0:031)
 0:154
(0:033)
 0:171
(0:044)
 0:074
(0:032)
 0:066
(0:033)
 0:118
(0:043)
Child5  0:179
(0:037)
 0:218
(0:038)
 0:091
(0:053)
 0:015
(0:038)
 0:012
(0:039)
 0:042
(0:054)
Em.other 0:055
(0:079)
0:058
(0:037)
0:047
(0:054)
0:046
(0:038)
0:023
(0:039)
0:055
(0:053)
Adult65 0:136
(0:051)
0:108
(0:052)
0:330
(0::081)
 0:034
(0:052)
 0:057
(0:053)
0:201
(0:081)
LIMIT_1 4:080
(0:2975)
3:153
(0:313)
1:141
(0:420)
2:832
(0:234)
2:213
(0:250)
 0:895
(0:299)
LIMIT_2 4:452
(0:298)
3:563
(0:313)
1:992
(0:421)
3:479
(0:234)
2:921
(0:250)
0:585
(0:299)
Obs.total 33625 30725 15548 33477 31381 19807
Log likel.  24958  23049  12785  28976  27025  15727
Ps.R2 0:118 0:141 0:053 0:122 0:137 0:048
(*) and (**) stand for signicance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively; s.e. in parenthesis.
The dependent variable takes the value 0 if NW, 1 if PT, 2 if FT.
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Table 6: Men Ordered Logit, alternative specications for the non-work status, EPA denitions for PT and
FT situations.
2000 2008
1A 1B 1C 1A 1B 1C
Age 0:320
(0:016)
0:312
(0:022)
0:112
(0:023)
0:296
(0:015)
0:309
(0:018)
0:107
(0:022)
Age2  0:004
(0:00017)
 0:005
(0:0002)
 0:001
(0:0003)
 0:004
(0:0002)
 0:005
(0:0002)
 0:001
(0:0003)
Edu2 0:351
(0:046)
0:315
(0:058)
0:429
(0:063)
0:319
(0:042)
0:298
(0:049)
0:399
(0:068)
Edu3 0:574
(0:049)
0:405
(0:060)
0:761
(0:072)
0:425
(0:045)
0:286
(0:050)
0:651
(0:074)
Edu4 0:990
(0:061)
0:760
(0:070)
1:060
(0:091)
0:815
(0:056)
0:611
(0:062)
0:781
(0:089)
Married 0:646
(0:122)
0:625
(0:174)
0:831
(0:140)
0:432
(0:062)
0:422
(0:078)
0:522
(0:079)
Em.par 0:062
(0:036)
0:129
(0:044)
 0:153
(0:050)
0:294
(0:036)
0:412
(0:040)
 0:196
(0:060)
Un.par  0:847
(0:087)
 0:547
(0:124)
 1:070
(0:100)
 0:394
(0:063)
0:057
(0:084)
 1:047
(0:083)
Child1 0:027
(0:071)
0:418
(0:126)
 0:099
(0:079)
0:086
(0:060)
0:217
(0:081)
 0:087
(0:073)
Child2  0:107
(0:064)
0:151
(0:103)
 0:179
(0:073)
 0:021
(0:053)
0:049
(0:070)
 0:066
(0:068)
Child3  0:0007
(0:047)
0:101
(0:067)
 0:001
(0:059)
0:112
(0:048)
0:164
(0:059)
0:021
(0:066)
Child4  0:030
(0:045)
0:077
(0:059)
 0:064
(0:060)
0:092
(0:047)
0:169
(0:056)
 0:099
(0:070)
Child5 0:280
(0:047)
0:364
(0:054)
0:096
(0:070)
0:149
(0:052)
0:155
(0:058)
0:089
(0:088)
Em.other 0:016
(0:0424)
 0:058
(0:049)
0:042
(0:067)
0:143
(0:052)
0:140
(0:058)
0:097
(0:087)
Adult65 0:058
(0:055)
0:072
(0:063)
 0:013
(0:085)
0:070
(0:069)
0:071
(0:075)
0:044
(0:124)
LIMIT_1 4:583
(0:402)
3:162
(0:548)
0:823
(0:548)
3:555
(0:358)
2:796
(0:452)
 0:165
(0:496)
LIMIT_2 4:676
(0:401)
3:297
(0:548)
1:036
(0:548)
3:696
(0:358)
2:982
(0:452)
0:222
(0:496)
Obs.total 33022 31271 28697 31294 30093 27330
Log likel.  14272  10573  7986  14052  11315  7207
Ps.R2 0:194 0:270 0:064 0:151 0:207 0:035
(*) and (**) stand for signicance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively; s.e. in parenthesis.
The dependent variable takes the value 0 if NW, 1 if PT, 2 if FT.
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Table 7: Alternative denitions for Voluntary and Involuntary PT and FT workers
Voluntary PT and Involuntary PT
Denition 1
VPT: FT not wanted
IPT: FT not found
Denition 2
VPT: FT not wanted
IPT: other han FT not wanted
Denition 3
VPT: FT not wanted+ other reason if not want more hours
IPT: FT not found + other reason if want more hours
Def. EPA
VPT: other than FT not found
IPT: FT not found
PT and FT Unemployment
All Def. PTU: searching PT only + PT as rst option
Denition 1 FTU: searching FT only
All but Def. 1 FTU: searching FT only + FT as rst option + any type
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that unemployment is mainly involuntary and so tying the non-work category only to this situation adds a
lot of noise to the estimation procedure. In contrast, the non participation situation is mainly a voluntary
choice, so including the inactive population in the non-work category provides a more natural ordering of
the employment alternatives. It is worth noting that the e¤ect of family characteristics on the employment
probabilities is very di¤erent across genders, the marital status and the unemployment of the partner have
opposite e¤ects on the employment probabilities of men and women, respectively, whereas the presence of
small children decreases the employment probability of women in all cases and has not a clear e¤ect in the
case of men. To explore the importance of an involuntary employment situation we propose to estimate the
implications of di¤erent denitions of a workers labor status. The ordered model estimation will help to
choose the more suitable denition of employment categories.
Our aim is to nd the prole of a (voluntary) PT worker, so we have to address two questions. The rst
one is how to classify the unemployed into PT or FT workers and the second one is how to decide when a
PT employment situation is voluntary or involuntary. With respect to the rst question, we can only use the
options described in Table 3 to dene the two unemployment categories, according with the job searching
options. With respect to the second one, we can use at least two criteria, whether the worker would like
working more hours or not (the hours criterium), the reasons of having a PT work (the reasons criterium,
Table 2), or di¤erent combinations of the two. In all model specications we assume that a FT employment
status is voluntary and that the non-work category includes only the inactive. The PT and FT categories
are modied to capture the unemployeds preferences about workweeks and the employeds voluntary or
involuntary situation, respectively. The dependent variable will take the value 0 if the status is non-work,
the value 1 if the status is voluntary PT employment or unemployment searching for a PT job, and the value
2 if the status is FT employment, involuntary PT employment or unemployment searching for a FT job.
Table 7 describes a selected group of the denitions used in the estimation. The distribution of the
unemployed between PT and FT workers can be done using di¤erent classications of the job searching
options. From a workers perspective, the ve searching options can be ordered in di¤erent ways going from
searching for PT only to searching for FT only. With respect to the distribution of the employed between
voluntary and involuntary workers the o¢ cial statistics identify the involuntary PT employment with the
share of PT workers that have not found a FT job, so the voluntary PT employment share is just the rest of
PT employment categories (see Table 2). According with this denition, those workers that have a PT job
because the type of activity they develop or other reasons are classied as voluntary.8 One way to solve this
ambiguity using the reasons criterium is to dene the voluntary PT employment as the number of workers
8Since 2004 the type of activitydeveloped is not listed as a possible reason of having a part-time job, and family obligations
is split into two di¤erent reasons, taking care of children and other dependent adultsand other family reasons.
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Table 8: Women Ordered Logit 2008, extended PT and FT denitions
Def 1 Def 2 Def 3 EPA Def
Age 0:081
(0:007)
0:081
(0:006)
0:076
(0:006)
0:081
(0:006)
Age2  0:001
(0:00008)
 0:001
(0:00008)
 0:001
(0:00007)
 0:001
(0:00007)
Edu2 0:235
(0:022)
0:193
(0:020)
0:203
(0:020)
0:222
(0:019)
Edu3 0:632
(0:023)
0:555
(0:022)
0:544
(0:021)
0:573
(0:021)
Edu4 1:285
(0:027)
1:141
(0:026)
1:136
(0:024)
1:169
(0:024)
Married  0:329
(0:031)
 0:306
(0:030)
 0:316
(0:028)
 0:279
(0:027)
Em.par 0:249
(0:024)
0:252
(0:023)
0:246
(0:022)
0:253
(0:021)
Un.par 0:428
(0:047)
0:497
(0:044)
0:523
(0:042)
0:418
(0:042)
Child1  0:516
(0:025)
 0:427
(0:024)
 0:542
(0:023)
 0:491
(0:022)
Child2  0:250
(0:022)
 0:199
(0:021)
 0:258
(0:020)
 0:242
(0:019)
Child3  0:079
(0:021)
 0:058
(0:020)
 0:081
(0:019)
 0:077
(0:018)
Child4  0:036
(0:021)
 0:029
(0:021)
 0:024
(0:020)
 0:027
(0:019)
Child5  0:023
(0:023)
 0:010
(0:024)
 0:013
(0:023)
 0:014
(0:022)
Em.other 0:022
(0:025)
 0:001
(0:024)
 0:002
(0:023)
0:010
(0:023)
Adult65  0:045
(0:034)
 0:067
(0:033)
 0:056
(0:032)
 0:045
(0:031)
LIMIT_1 1:075
(0:158)
0:917
(0:149)
0:723
(0:143)
0:982
(0:139)
LIMIT_2 1:220
(0:158)
1:041
(0:149)
0:999
(0:143)
1:423
(0:139)
Obs.total 30131 33448 33448 33448
Log likel.  21272  23202  27239  29254
Ps.R2 0:165 0:152 0:133 0:129
(*) and (**) stand for signicance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively; s.e. in parenthesis.
The dependent variable takes the value 0 if NW, 1 if vol PT or u-searching PT, 2 if FT or inv PT or u-searching FT .
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Table 9: Women Multinomial Logit under Denition 2
2000 2008
PT FT PT FT
Intercept  5:536
(1:370)
 1:875
(0:312)
 5:368
(0:743)
 1:540
(0:267)
Age 0:098
(0:045)
0:145
(0:013)
0:141
(0:027)
0:137
(0:011)
Age2  0:002
(0:0005)
 0:002
(0:0001)
 0:002
(0:0003)
 0:002
(0:0001)
Edu2 0:286
(0:117)
0:221
(0:033)
0:331
(0:084)
0:316
(0:035)
Edu3 0:512
(0:135)
0:900
(0:037)
0:430
(0:091)
0:936
(0:038)
Edu4 0:850
(0:178)
2:054
(0:049)
0:921
(0:113)
2:028
(0:048)
Married  0:022
(0:351)
 0:524
(0:117)
 0:298
(0:114)
 0:555
(0:055)
Em.par 0:137
(0:200)
0:121
(0:045)
0:399
(0:102)
0:422
(0:040)
Un.par 0:311
(0:290)
0:401
(0:073)
0:858
(0:169)
0:875
(0:078)
Child1  0:291
(0:140)
 0:746
(0:045)
 0:394
(0:093)
 0:767
(0:042)
Child2  0:136
(0:124)
 0:446
(0:042)
 0:043
(0:078)
 0:345
(0:037)
Child3 0:058
(0:109)
 0:280
(0:032)
 0:078
(0:078)
 0:107
(0:035)
Child4 0:117
(0:112)
 0:099
(0:032)
 0:058
(0:084)
 0:061
(0:036)
Child5  0:219
(0:143)
 0:202
(0:037)
 0:040
(0:103)
 0:030
(0:043)
Em.other 0:211
(0:149)
0:037
(0:035)
0:112
(0:101)
0:002
(0:042)
Adult65  0:929
(0:301)
0:041
(0:050)
 0:340
(0:156)
 0:133
(0:057)
Obs.Total 33568 33448
Log likel.  21624  23114
Ps.R2 0:1552 0:1553
(*) and (**) stand for signicance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively; s.e. in parenthesis.
The dependent var is 0 if NW, 1 if vol PT or u- searching PT, 2 if FT or u-searching FT or inv PT.
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Table 10: Men Ordered and Multinomial Logit models 2008 under Denition 2
ordered model multinomial model
PT FT
Interc.  6:716
(2:997)
 0:925
(0:495)
Age 0:161
(0:011)
0:198
(0:142)
0:258
(0:023)
Age2  0:002
(0:0001)
 0:003
(0:0015)
 0:004
(0:0002)
Edu2 0:151
(0:028)
0:307
(0:471)
0:233
(0:051)
Edu3 0:157
(0:029)
0:832
(0:397)
0:214
(0:053)
Edu4 0:411
(0:036)
2:031
(0:416)
0:745
(0:071)
Married 0:149
(0:044)
0:254
(0523)
0:274
(0:089)
Em.par. 0:251
(0:023)
0:396
(0:279)
0:518
(0:044)
Un.par. 0:121
(0:047)
 1:243
(0:215)
0:221
(0:090)
Child1 0:167
(0:045)
0:210
(0:490)
0:456
(0:107)
Child2 0:048
(0:038)
 0:133
(0:403)
0:163
(0:085)
Child3 0:096
(0:032)
 0:075
(0:374)
0:233
(0:067)
Child4 0:098
(0:031)
 0:409
(0:472)
0:194
(0:060)
Child5 0:084
(0:033)
 0:679
(0:490)
0:092
(0:059)
Em.other 0:089
(0:033)
0:243
(0:553)
0:197
(0:060)
Adult65 0:038
(0:044)
0:071
(0:586)
0:037
(0:079)
LIMIT_1 1:066
LIMIT_2 1:081
Obs.Total 31258 31258
Log likel.  9100  9114
Ps.R2 0:255 0:254
(*) and (**) stand for signicance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively; s.e. in parenthesis.
The dependent var in the ordered (multinomial) model is dened as in Table 8 (Table 9).
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that do not want a FT employment and compute the involuntary PT employment as the residual (Denition
2). Notice that Denition 1 is the less ambiguous of all since it includes in the voluntary PT category only
those workers that do not want a FT job and in the involuntary category only those that have not found a
FT employment. The problem with this denition is that we loose a lot of observations and the heterogeneity
of PT employment. Table 8 describes the female results of the ordered model for each denition in Table
7.9 . To gain some intuition on these results Table 9 reports a multinomial estimation of the labor categories
implied by Denition 2. In this case higher education has a larger and positive impact on the probability of
FT employment, being married and having children aged below 12 decrease, respectively, the probability of
any type of employment (stronger e¤ect on FT employment), and having children aged 12 or more decreases
the probability of FT employment but it is not signicant for PT employment. Moreover, the presence of
adults older than 65 decreases the probability of any type of employment but it has a bigger impact on PT
employment.
Table 10 reports the male results of both the ordered and the multinomial estimations under Denition
2. Comparing the results of the ordered model with those of women (Denition 2 in Table 8) we nd
opposite signs and larger absolute values for women in the married and childrens coe¢ cients (although
not all signicative). Moreover, education coe¢ cients are larger for women than for men. Comparing the
multinomial estimations across genders shows that education has a positive e¤ect on any type of employment,
but it is more important in the case of women; moreover, higher education has a stronger e¤ect on FT
employment than on PT employment in the case of women, whereas this e¤ect is the opposite in the case
of men. Finally, family variables like being married or having children are more important for FT than for
PT and have opposite signs across genders; in the case of men these variables have a positive e¤ect on FT
employment and are not signicative for PT, while in the case of women the presence of children aged 5 or
more becomes not signicant for PT employment.
4.2 Employment properties
In this section we restrict the sample to salaried individuals and add a set of employment related variables
as controls. These variables include four categories for the type of activity and occupation dened from the
EPA socioeconomic classication: primary sector, blue-collar, white-collar/professional and service sector
(base category); the type of contract variable takes the value 1 if the employment contract is permanent and
0 if it is temporary; the private sector variable takes the value 1 if the individual is employed in the private
sector and 0 if employed in the public sector; nally, the variable want to work more hourstakes the value
9The results for 2000 (not shown) are similar.
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1 if the individual wants to work more hours and 0 otherwise.10
First we estimate di¤erent specications of a binary choice model where the dependent variable takes
the value 1 if the individual works FT and the value 0 if she or he works PT, using the EPA classication.
The estimation results are reported in Tables 11 and 12 for women and men, respectively. A summary
of the main gender asymmetries found is reported in Table 13. Second we estimate a multinomial model
where we distinguish between voluntary and involuntary PT employment using the alternative denitions
discussed above. Due to sample limitations, in this case the focus is on the female population of 2008.11
The estimation results using the combination of the reasons and hours criteria of Denition 3 are reported
in Tables 14 and 15.
In all cases the inclusion of the market variables improves considerably the explanatory power of the
model and, at the same time, implies similar values and signicance levels for most individual and family
coe¢ cients. One remarkable exception is the being married coe¢ cient, which increases considerably its
absolute value in the market models in the case of women, but not in the case of men. That is, the marital
status tends to be more (less) relevant for women (men) in the market framework.
In the market framework of the binomial estimations we consider two models (model 2 and model 3),
the di¤erence is the inclusion of the variable want to work more hoursin model 3, which tries to capture
the presence of involuntary employment. The negative sign and signicance of this coe¢ cient in Tables 11
and 12 reect that the involuntary employment situation is positively related to PT employment. Some of
the most sensitive coe¢ cients to the inclusion of the want to work more hoursvariable are those of being
marriedand the contract type. Again, the marital status becomes more relevant for women than for men.
On the other hand, the decrease of the contract type coe¢ cient (all market variables coe¢ cients decrease)
suggests that the desire of working more hours is mainly associated to temporary contracts regardless of
gender.
Some of the gender asymmetries that showed up in the multinomial estimations of the non-market model
in the previous section (inactive + active population) also arise in the market model (employed population).
Being married and having children decrease the probability of FT employment for a woman, whereas for men
being married increases the probability of FT and having children is in general not signicant. In the case
of men, education only matters at the highest level and, in contrast to the case of women, it has a negative
inuence on the probability of FT employment. A related feature is that working as a professional increases
the probability of having a PT employment for a man, but not for a woman (it increases the probability of
10We have also included four rm size categories in an extended model and nd that these variables are very signicant,
being more likely to have PT with small rms than with large rms. These results are available only for the year 2000 and can
be obtained from the authors upon request.
11The few observations for men with a PT job do not allow to split the sample into voluntary and involuntary PT workers.
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Table 11: Salaried Women Binary Logit, EPA denitions for PT and FT situations
2000 2008
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Interc.  1:233
(0:067)
 1:510
(0:753)
2:964
(0:762)
1:405
(0:447)
 3:081
(0:461)
3:814
(0:498)
Age 0:094
(0:028)
0:018
(0:030)
0:016
(0:033)
 0:016
(0:018)
 0:039
(0:019)
 0:031
(0:021)
Age2  0:001
(0:0003)
 0:0004
(0:0004)
 0:0005
(0:0004)
0:0002
(0:0002)
0:0002
(0:0002)
0:00001
(0:003)
Edu2 0:457
(0:076)
0:389
(0:082)
0:453
(0:088)
0:370
(0:063)
0:305
(0:068)
0:288
(0:073)
Edu3 1:200
(0:082)
1:107
(0:092)
1:114
(0:099)
0:939
(0:065)
0:778
(0:070)
0:733
(0:075)
Edu4 1:731
(0:091)
1:255
(0:133)
1:298
(0:149)
1:692
(0:072)
1:122
(0:091)
1:042
(0:097)
Married 0:050
(0:171)
 0:057
(0:185)
 0:106
(0:202)
 0:150
(0:066)
 0:257
(0:068)
 0:455
(0:075)
Em.par. 0:111
(0:117)
0:003
(0:127)
 0:067
(0:139)
0:115
(0:077)
0:046
(0:082)
 0:016
(0:087)
Un.par.  0:085
(0:176)
 0:232
(0:192)
 0:200
(0:214)
0:138
(0:124)
0:199
(0:131)
0:403
(0:141)
Child1  0:229
(0:092)
 0:347
(0:097)
 0:483
(0:105)
 0:769
(0:055)
 0:844
(0:058)
 0:967
(0:062)
Child2  0:406
(0:083)
 0:459
(0:090)
 0:564
(0:096)
 0:416
(0:051)
 0:484
(0:054)
 0:525
(0:057)
Child3  0:361
(0:067)
 0:455
(0:072)
 0:494
(0:078)
 0:125
(0:052)
 0:153
(0:055)
 0:127
(0:059)
Child4  0:204
(0:069)
 0:150
(0:074)
 0:158
(0:081)
 0:056
(0:058)
 0:059
(0:062)
0:032
(0:068)
Child5  0:171
(0:085)
 0:120
(0:090)
 0:078
(0:098)
0:078
(0:073)
0:076
(0:078)
0:079
(0:084)
Em.other  0:230
(0:084)
 0:092
(0:091)
 0:114
(0:098)
 0:119
(0:070)
 0:064
(0:075)
 0:032
(0:081)
Adult65 0:317
(0:139)
0:206
(0:146)
0:150
(0:152)
0:085
(0:111)
0:059
(0:119)
0:106
(0:128)
Primary 2:509
(0:244)
2:478
(0:576)
2:814
(0:220)
2:794
(0:222)
Blue col. 1:995
(0:122)
1:876
(0:129)
1:566
(0:089)
1:498
(0:092)
Profess. 0:055
(0:118)
 0:055
(0:131)
0:207
(0:074)
0:169
(0:080)
Contract 1:134
(0:066)
0:931
(0:072)
0:920
(0:049)
0:661
(0:053)
Private  1:569
(0:090)
 1:503
(0:095)
 1:619
(0:068)
 1:563
(0:073)
+hours  3:975
(0:184)
 2:477
(0:071)
Obs. 9751 9751 9751 14576 14576 14576
R2 0:080 0:188 0:290 0:068 0:154 0:239
(*) and (**) stand for signicance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively; s.e. in parenthesis.
The intercept (not reported) is always signicative. The dependent var is 1 if FT, 0 if PT.
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Table 12: Salaried Men Binary Logit, EPA denitions for PT and FT situations
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept  1:023
(1:0320)
 1:546
(1:546)
 0:878
(1:096)
Age 0:250
(0:047)
0:239
(0:047)
0:248
(0:049)
Age2  0:003
(0:0005)
 0:003
(0:0006)
 0:003
(0:0006)
Edu2 0:006
(0:190)
0:049
(0:193)
0:005
(0:196)
Edu3  0:200
(0:188)
 0:128
(0:202)
 0:064
(0:204)
Edu4  0:737
(0:186)
 0:419
(0:237)
 0:446
(0:240)
Married 0:574
(0:169)
0:415
(0:171)
0:341
(0:178)
Em.par.  0:087
(0:137)
 0:054
(0:138)
 0:119
(0:141)
Un.par.  0:494
(0:218)
 0:436
(0:221)
 0:139
(0:229)
Child1  0:231
(0:158)
 0:229
(0:159)
 0:175
(0:162)
Child2  0:045
(0:161)
 0:050
(0:161)
 0:013
(0:166)
Child3 0:006
(0:162)
0:005
(0:162)
0:103
(0:165)
Child4 0:168
(0:183)
0:163
(0:183)
0:181
(0:186)
Child5 0:512
(0:223)
0:446
(0:222)
0:399
(0:223)
Em.other  0:400
(0:214)
 0:366
(0:212)
 0:327
(0:212)
Adult65 0:361
(0:344)
0:357
(0:346)
0:414
(0:350)
Primary 0:584
(0:326)
0:650
(0:331)
Blue col. 1:119
(0:164)
1:162
(0:167)
Profess.  0:162
(0:166)
 0:313
(0:172)
Contract 1:281
(0:138)
0:956
(0:144)
Private  0:499
(0:163)
 0:529
(0:166)
+hours  2:352
(0:138)
Observ. 19470 19470 19470
R2 0:036 0:075 0:151
( * ) a n d ( * * ) s t a n d fo r s ig n ic a n c e a t t h e 5 a n d 1 0 p e r c e n t l e v e l s , r e s p e c t iv e ly.
S . e . in p a r e n t h e s i s . T h e d e p e n d e n t va r i s 1 i f F T , 0 i f P T .
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Table 13: Main Gender Asymmetries in the probability of FT employment, binary models
Family Personal Market
Men
Married (+)
Children (not)
High education (-)
Rest education levels (not)
Professional (-)
Women
Married (-)
Children (-)
" Education )" Coef
All education levels (+)
Professional (+)
female FT employment). A summary of these important gender asymmetries is reported in Table 13, but
they should be interpreted with caution since the number of male observations is very small.
Finally, comparing the results of the binary market model across 2000 and 2008 for the female population
reveals that some family characteristics like being married and having small children have become more
relevant, increasing the probability of PT employment against the FT employment. In contrast, the level of
education has become less important. One possible interpretation is that advances in the regulation of PT
employment have beneted the consolidation of PT as an alternative employment option for many women,
but another possibility is the reemergence of attitudes towards traditional gender roles in recent cohorts,
which can be an obstacle for greater gender equality in the labor market. This and the gender asymmetries
discussed above suggest that the path of PT employment in Spain is consolidating in very di¤erent ways for
men and women separately.
To conclude this section we analyze the determinants of involuntary PT employment among salaried
women (living with a partner). The aim of this nal stage is to conrm the importance of involuntary
employment and to identify the prole of an involuntary PT worker. We have estimated several specications
of a multinomial model, using the alternative employment status denitions listed in Table 7. Table 14 reports
the results for the best t we found. In this case, the dependent variable takes the value 0 if the status is
voluntary PT, the value 1 if the status is involuntary PT and the value 2 if it is FT employment. Model 1
refers to the estimation of the model with individual and family characteristics only and model 2 refers to
the extended model including the market variables. Note that now the variable want to work more hoursis
not in the list of explanatory variables, since whether the worker wants to work more hours or not is already
included in the denitions of involuntary and voluntary PT situations.
As above, the inclusion of the market variables adds substantial explanatory power to the model and both
the signs and signicance levels of most variables in the market model are similar to those in the non-market
setup. These results complement those of Table 11 in that they conrm the importance of accounting for
26
Table 14: Salaried Women Multinomial Logit model 2008 under Denition 3
(1) (2)
Inv PT FT Inv PT FT
Intercept 0:947
(0:795)
2:633
(0:567)
1:088
(0:813)
4:400
(0:584)
Age2 0:015
(0:032)
 0:015
(0:024)
0:025
(0:033)
 0:035
(0:024)
Age 0:0006
(0:0004)
0:00002
(0:0003)
 0:0006
(0:0004)
 0:00002
(0:0003)
Edu2  0:129
(0:103)
0:314
(0:079)
 0:131
(0:104)
0:253
(0:083)
Edu3  0:359
(0:110)
0:788
(0:081)
 0:348
(0:112)
0:640
(0:086)
Edu4  0:395
(0:128)
1:537
(0:089)
 0:397
(0:156)
0:971
(0:109)
Married  0:595
(0:117)
 0:436
(0:090)
 0519
(0:118)
 0:501
(0:092)
Em.par. 0:004
(0:133)
0:116
(0:096)
 0:053
(0:133)
0:068
(0:099)
Un.par. 0:528
(0:213)
0:404
(0:168)
0:498
(0:213)
0:433
(0:171)
Child1  0:788
(0:099)
 1:075
(0:070)
 0:761
(0:100)
 1:129
(0:072)
Child2  0:363
(0:089)
 0:552
(0:062)
 0:383
(0:091)
 0:621
(0:064)
Child3 0:043
(0:089)
 0:109
(0:065)
0:007
(0:090)
 0:153
(0:067)
Child4 0:241
(0:098)
0:055
(0:075)
0:198
(0:099)
0:031
(0:078)
Child5 0:066
(0:124)
0:102
(0:094)
0:079
(0:126)
0:102
(0:098)
Em.other  0:013
(0:118)
 0:125
(0:091)
 0:025
(0:119)
 0:077
(0:095)
Adult65 0:300
(0:190)
0:218
(0:143)
0:274
(0:89)
0:178
(0:149)
Primary  0:847
(0:440)
2:416
(0:0282
Blue col.  0:540
(0:173)
1:359
(0:108)
Profess.  0:013
(0:138)
0:213
(0:088)
Private  0:123
(0:125)
 1:659
(0:086)
Contract  0:904
(0:076)
0:513
(0:061)
Obs.Total 12565 14576
Log likel.  9823  9052
Ps.R2 0:069 0:1412
(*) and (**) stand for signicance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively; s. e. in parenthesis.
The dependent var is 0 if voluntary PT, 1 if involuntary PT, 2 if FT.
27
Table 15: Odds Ratios, Salaried Women Multinomial estimation under Denition 3
(1) (2)
Inv. PT FT Inv. PT FT
Age 1:015 0:985 1:025 0:966
Age2 1:000 1:000 0:999 1:000
Edu2 0:878 1:369 0:877 1:288
Edu3 0:698 2:199 0:706 1:896
Edu4 0:674 4:651 0:672 2:641
Married 0:552 0:647 0:595 0:606
Em.par. 1:004 1:123 0:948 0:934
Un.par. 1:696 1:498 1:639 1:542
Child1 0:455 0:342 0:467 0:323
Child2 0:696 0:576 0:682 0:537
Child3 1:044 0:897 1:007 0:858
Child4 1:273 1:057 1:219 1:031
Child5T 1:068 1:107 1:082 1:107
Em.other 0:987 0:882 0:975 0:926
Adult65 1:350 1:244 1:315 1:195
Primary sec. 0:429 11:20
Blue collar 0:583 3:890
Professional 0:987 1:237
Private sec. 0:884 0:190
Contract type 0:405 1:670
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involuntary employment in the study of PT situations and throw some light on the prole of a voluntary PT
female worker. It is clear now that more education decreases the probability of involuntary employment and
that being marriedand having small children are very important determinants of voluntary PT employment.
Furthermore, having grown up children or a temporary contract increases the probability of an involuntary
PT situation. The quantitative implications for the relative employment probabilities are summarized in
Table 15. These odds ratios reveal that the probability of involuntary PT employment is about 0.60 times
the probability of voluntary PT if the woman is married, that is, the probability of involuntary relative to
voluntary PT employment decreases by 40 percent if the woman is married. On the other hand, having
children aged between 12 and 15 and having a xed term contract increase the probability of involuntary
PT relative to voluntary PT about 22 percent and 60 percent, respectively.
5 Conclusion
We have shown some important features of part-time employment in Spain and analyzed the extent of
part-time employment as a voluntary option for employed and non-employed individuals. To illustrate
the importance of traditional gender roles within the family, we have developed a two-adult household
model inspired on Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Basu (2004) where the individualsconcerns about the
traditional division of labor between market and home production are crucial for the stability properties of
the households pattern of employment. Assuming that the man works full-time and that there is no part-
time wage penalty, the theoretical model predicts that if the womans full-time employment is optimal, then
part-time employment is always preferred to non-employment; but if the womans part-time employment is
optimal, then full-time employment can be preferred to non-employment or not. In contrast, if a part-time
wage penalty exists, the womans non-employment state can always be optimal.
In the empirical analysis we have focused on working age individuals living with a partner. First, we have
shown that the model is sensitive to the chosen denition of voluntary part-time, and we use a denition
based on the desire of working more hours combined with the reasons of having a part-time job. Second,
we have explored the relative importance of individual, family and job related variables on the probabilities
of involuntary and voluntary part-time employment. The empirical analysis has been developed in two
stages. In the rst stage we have omitted market variables and included the employed and non-employed
individuals. The unemployed population was split between part-time and full-time workers according with
their workweek searching options, and the part-time employees classied into part-time or full-time workers
according with their voluntary (do not want a full-time job) or involuntary employment situation. The main
empirical ndings in this rst stage have been: (i) education has a positive e¤ect on part-time and full-time
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labor supplies, but it is more important for women than for men; (ii) in the case of women, the e¤ect of
higher education on the probability of full-time labor supply is more than twice the e¤ect on part-time labor
supply, whereas it is just the opposite in the case of men; (iii) in the case of women, family variables like
being married or having children of any age have a negative e¤ect on any type of labor supply, whereas these
variables are not signicant or have a positive e¤ect on the full-time labor supply of men.
In the second stage, we have included some market variables as controls and restricted the analysis to
employed individuals. The inclusion of the market variables improved considerably the explanatory power
of the model and, at the same time, kept similar values and signicance levels for most individual and family
coe¢ cients. Unfortunately the mens population size was too small in this case and we could not use the
extended denitions for voluntary and involuntary part-time employment. We limitted the comparative
gender analysis to binomial estimations using the o¢ cial denitions but adding a new control variable
related to the desire of working more hours. The inclusion of this explanatory variable suggested a positive
association between temporary contracts and the presence of involuntary PT employment independently of
gender. In contrast, being married and having children decreased the probability of full-time employment
for a woman, but not for a man. For men, education only mattered at the highest level and, in contrast to
the case of women, it favored part-time employment.
Finally, we have estimated the prole of a part-time employed woman using our extended denition for
voluntary and involuntary part-time employment. The results showed clearly the importance of education
in reducing the probability of involuntary employment, as well as the importance of being marriedand
having small children. In contrast, having grown-up children and holding a temporary contract appeared
as important factors increasing a womans probability of being involuntary part-time employed relative to
voluntary part-time employed, being these e¤ects about 22 percent and 60 percent, respectively.
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 The households optimization problem
If x =

c; k; lm; l

f

is an optimal solution to the households problem, then it must satisfy the budget
constraint g1 (x) = c + k  
P
wili  0; the time constraints g2 (x) = lm   1  0; g3 (x) = lf   1  0; and
the non-negative constraints, lm  0; lf  0; k  0; c  0, and there must exist, respectively, multipliers
1; 2; 3; 1; 2; 3; 4 associated to these constraints such that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satised:
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xh = 0 h = c; k; lm; lf : (13)
j  0; h  0 8j;8h: (14)
Where U (x) is given by (6). Moreover, since the households utility function is strictly concave in c; k; and
the non-market time (2   lm   lf ), it follows that the solution to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, (x; ; );
solves the households problem:
()  (A)
1
1  (a+
P
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
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P
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A+ (A)
1
1 
; (15)
(1) If () > 0; k = () : (16)
c =
A
A+ (A)
1
1 
fa+P li (wi   b) + 2bg ; (17)
z =
A (A)
1
1 
A+ (A)
1
1 
fa+P li (wi   b) + 2bg if k > 0: (18)
(2) If ()  0; k = 0 :
c = a+
P
i
wil

i if k
 = 0; z = Ab(2 P
i
li ):
Where (18) follows from (1) and (15). The utility function implies that c > 0, so 4 = 0, 

1 > 0; and at
least one li must be strictly positive. The utility function also implies that z
 > 0, so if k = 0; it must be true
that at least one li must be strictly less than one. Suppose that wi > b; i = m; f; so we restrict the solution to
cases where participation can be positive for any individual. From (11) follows that c 1 Az 1 = 3  0,
so 2 = c
 1wm   Az 1b +S > 0; hence (12) implies lm = 1, so (13) implies 1 = 0: >From (15), if
Ab  (A) 11  wm < 0; k > 0 8lf  0; so 3 = 0: lf follows from (11) and it is given in the text. Two cases
if Ab  (A) 11  wm > 0 : (1) k = 0, 3 > 0; if lf  (Ab  (A)
1
1  wm)=(Ab+ (A)
1
1  ) < 1; so it must be
lf < 1 and so 

3 = 0. If wf >

 (Ab)

+ S

w1 m ; then l

f > 0 and so 

2 = 0; in this case l

f is given by the
implicit solution to  

wm + wf l

f
 1
wf +  (Ab)

(1  lf ) 1 + S = 0, but if wf 

 (Ab)

+ S

w1 m ;
lf = 0: (2) k
 > 0 if lf > (Ab   (A)
1
1  wm)=(Ab+ (A)
1
1  ) > 0; so 0 < lf  1, expression for lf given in
the text.
A.2 Propositions and proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Using (17) and (18), the households welfare can be written as a function of the individualsmarket time:
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If k > 0;
V (lm; lf ) =

1+(A)

1 
1 
 (a+
P
li (wi   b) + 2b) + (lm   lf )S:
If k = 0;
V (lm; lf ) =

a+
P
liwi

 + 

Ab

2 
P
li

 + (lm   lf )S:
>From (11) and (12) , lm = 1: (1) k
 > 0; given lm = lm; implies that V (1; lf ) is strictly decreasing in
lf if wf  b, so lf = 0: If wf > b; V (1; lf ) is strictly concave and has a unique critical point 0 < lf  1; if
lf 2 (0; 1) ; V (1; lf ) is increasing in the interval

0; lf

and decreasing in

lf ; 1

; if lf = 1; V (1; lf ) is strictly
increasing in lf for lf 2 (0; 1) : It follows that (i) if FT is optimal, lf = 1; V (1; lf ) > V (1; 0) 8lf 2 (0; 1) ;
so PT  NW: (ii) If PT is optimal, lf 2 (0; 1) ; V (1; 1)  V (1; 0) or V (1; 1) < V (1; 0) ; so FT  NW or
NW  FT: (2) k = 0; from the households problem we know that if lf > 0; it must be true that lf < 1:
So if PT is optimal, V (1; 1)  V (1; 0) or V (1; 1) < V (1; 0) depending on wf :
A.2.2 The power weighting factor
Suppose that wm  wf > b: Given wages and technology parameters, the power-weighting factor is a function
of lf alone,  (lf ) ; with  (0) = ,  (1) = ;

; 
  [0; 1] and 0 < 0; 00 < 0 8lf 2 (0; 1) : Moreover,
00 (lf ) =0 (lf ) is decreasing in lf , with 00 (lf ) =0 (lf )!1 as lf ! 0 and 00 (lf ) =0 (lf )!  > 0 as lf ,! 1:
The relationship between the womans labor supply and the weighting factor It follows from the
solution to the optimization problem provided in the text that lsf is independent of  if sm = sf ; otherwise
they dene a non-increasing relationship between lsf and  if sm > sf or a non-decreasing relationship if
sm < sf :
sm > sf : ` () =
8<: 0 if   nl 2 (0; 1) if m <  < n
1 if   m
(19)
sm < sf : ` () =
8<: 0 if   nl 2 (0; 1) if n <  < m
1 if   m
(20)
Where n = (Y0   sf ) = (sm   sf ) ; m = (Y1   sf ) = (sm   sf ) ; Y0 > Y1; and l is the solution provided in the
text; if sm > sf ; `0 () < 0 and `00 () > 0 for m <  < n ; if sm < sf ; `0 () > 0 and `00 () > 0 for
n <  < m:
Denition 1 For given wages and technology parameters such that lm = 1, a households equilibrium
lf ; 


is a stationary solution to the iterative process lt 1 = `
 
t 1

; t =  (lt 1) ; t = 1; 2; ::; for given
0 2

; 

: That is, lf = ` (
) and  = 

lf

::
Let F dene the law of motion for the power weighting factor:
t = 
 
`
 
t 1

= F
 
t 1

; given 0 2

; 

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That is, a xed point of F is a household equilibrium. In case sm > sf ; (19) implies that F () = 
if   n; F () 2  ;  if  2 (m;n) and F () =  if   m; with F 0 () > 0 and F 00 () > 0 i¤
(sm   sf )

(1  ) 1 + 1

= ((sm   sf )+ sf ) < 00 (l ()) =0 (l ()) over (m;n) : In case sm < sf , (20)
implies that F () =  if   n; F () 2  ;  if  2 (n;m) and F () =  if   m; with F 0 () < 0 and
F 00 () < 0 over (n;m) :
Proposition 2 Suppose that wm  wf > b and sm > sf :
(1) The household equilibrium is unique and stable if n   or m   or m <  <  < n: It is given by
(0; ) if n  ; by (1; ) if m  ; or by

lf ; 


if m <  <  < n, where lf 2 (0; 1) and  2
 
; 

.
(2) If   m <  < n; (1; ) is a (locally) stable equilibrium, it can be unique or there can be additional
interior equilibria, alternating from unstable to (locally) stable.
(3) If   m < n  ; (0; ) and (1; ) are locally stable equilibria, there is also an interior solution which
can be unique and unstable or there are multiple (odd number) interior solutions alternating from unstable
to (locally) stable.
(4) If m   < n  ; (0; ) is a (locally) stable equilibrium, it can be unique or there can be an even number
of interior solutions alternating from (locally) stable to unstable.
Proof: In this case F is non-decreasing and m < n. (1) If m < n  ; F () =  8 2 ;  ; so there is a
unique xed point, F () = : Moreover, t =  t  1;80 2

; 

; it follows from (19) that the household
equilibrium (0; ) is unique and stable. If  < m < n; F () =  8 2 ;  ; so there is a unique xed point,
F
 


= : Moreover, t =  t  1;80 2

; 

; it follows that the household equilibrium
 
1; 

is unique
and stable. If m <  <  < n; F
 


> , F () < , F 0 > 0 over (m;n), F 00 > 0 over ("; n) for arbitrarily
small  > 0, and F 00 = 0 at most at one point  2 (m;n) ; so F must cut the 45o line (from above) at a unique
point  2  ; , F 0 () < 1: (2) If   m <  < n; F   =  = F (m) < m; F () <  = F (n). So if
F 00 > 0 over the whole (m;n) ; the unique and stable xed point of F is  and the corresponding household
equilibrium is
 
1; 

: But if F 00 < 0 over (m; ") for some arbitrarily small " > 0; F can cut the 45o line
from below at some 1 2 (m;) and must change concavity at just one point over (m;n) since F 00 > 0 close
to n: If such 1 exists, F must cross the 45o line (now from above) at some 2 2  1;  since F () < .
Since F 0  1 > 1 and F 0  2 < 1 the corresponding household equilibria  l1; 1 and  l2; 2 are (locally)
unstable and stable, respectively, being 0 < l2 < l1 < 1: (3) If   m < n  ; F   =  = F (m) < m;
F (n) =  = F () : Proceeding as in case (2) now there are two corner solutions
 
1; 

and (0; ) ; both
(locally stable), and there must be some additional interior solution since F must cut the 45o line from below
at least once. If F 00 > 0 over the whole (m;n) ; the interior solution is unique and unstable (F 0  1 > 1),
but if F 00 < 0 over (m; ") for some arbitrarily small " > 0; there can be two more interior solutions, 3
and 2, one unstable (F 0  3 > 1) and another (locally) stable (F 0  3 < 1); with 3 < 2 < 1: (4) If
m   < n  ; F   > ; F (n) = F () = : So  is a xed point of F and the corresponding household
equilibrium (0; ) will be unique and stable if F 0 () > 1 for all  2  ; n. Otherwise; there can be one 1
unstable (F 0  1 = 1)or two additional interior solutions, 2 < 1; 2 (locally) stable (F 0  2 < 1) and 1
unstable (F 0  1 > 1):
Proposition 3 Suppose that wm  wf > b and sm < sf :
(1) The household equilibrium is unique and stable if m   or n   or n <   m. It is given by (1; ) if
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m  ; or by (0; ) if n  ; or by

lf ; 


, lf 2 (0; 1) ;  2
 
; 

if  < m:
(2) There is a (locally) unstable interior household equilibrium and a (locally) stable cycle equilibrium if  <
m <  and F
 


> m: The interior equilibrium is given by (lf ; 
);  2  ;m ; and the cycle equilibrium
is given by
n
lcf ; 

; (1; c)
o
; lcf 2

lf ; 1

, c = F
 


<  if n < ; or it is given by
 
0; 

; (1; )
	
if
n  : But if F   < m, (lf ; );  2  ;m is unique and stable.
Proof: m > n; F is non-increasing and concave: (1) If m  ; F () =  8 2 [m;] ; so there is a unique
xed point F
 


=  and for any given 0 2

; 

, t =  t  1: If n  ; F () =  8 2

; n

; so there
is a unique xed point F () =  and for any given 0 2

; 

, t =  t  1: If n <  <   m; F (n) = ;
F (m) = , F () 2  ;  8 2 ;  and for any given 0 2 ; , t 2  ;  t  1, or if  < n <   m;
F () =  8 2 ; n ; F () 2  ;  8 2 (n;m) ; F () =  8 2 [m;] ; in either case there is a unique
and interior xed point. The result follows applying (20). (2) F (n) = ; F () =  8 2 [m;] ; so there is
a unique interior xed point, F () =  < m: If n > ; F () =  8 2 ; n ; 1 = F (0) = , F (1) =
 for any 0 2 [m;]; 1 = F (0) = , F (1) =  for any 0 2

; n

; t 2 [m;] t > 2 for any 0 6= ;
0 2 (n;m) : So

; 
	
; F
 


= ; F () = ; is a (locally) stable limit cycle and  is unstable. If n < 
and F
 


> m; 1 = F (0) = , 2 = F (1) = 
c; 3 = F (
c) =  for any 0 2 [m;] ; and t > m for
some t > 2 for any given 0 6= ; 0 2
 
;m

: So, in this case, the (locally) stable limit cycle is given by
; c
	
: But if F
 


< m; m > 1 > 3 > :: > 
 for any 0 2
 
; 

, or  < 1 < 3 < :: < 
 for any
0 2 (;m) ; so  is stable.
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B Statistical Appendix
Main descriptive statistics of explanatory variables, EPA 2008.
Women Men
variable Mean S.D Mean S.D
married 0.908 0.289 0.903 0.295
aged 43.21 10.61 44.54 10.16
aged2 1979.91 913.09 2086.77 896.71
edu1 0.265 0.441 0.237 0.426
edu2 0.292 0.456 0.307 0.461
edu3 0.260 0.438 0.289 0.454
edu4 0.184 0.387 0.166 0.371
child1 0.173 0.378 0.185 0.388
child2 0.184 0.387 0.196 0.397
child3 0.217 0.412 0.232 0.422
child4 0.165 0.374 0.175 0.380
child5 0.315 0.464 0.308 0.462
employment of partner 0.784 0.411 0.551 0.497
unemployment of partner 0.036 0.185 0.065 0.247
inactive partner 0.180 0.384 0.384 0.486
employment of other adults 0.251 0.433 0.245 0.430
adults older than 64 0.051 0.219 0.050 0.218
primary sector 0.040 0.196 0.0527 0.224
service sector 0.528 0.499 0.181 0.385
private sector 0.307 0.461 0.501 0.500
blue collar 0.074 0.263 0.369 0.483
professional 0.348 0.476 0.386 0.486
contract type 0.323 0.467 0.514 0.499
want to work more hours 0.050 0.217 0.051 0.22
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